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This article argues that third generation constructivism can make a central and 
overdue contribution to the practice of meta-theorising in IR. Meta-theory has so 
far restricted itself to exercises of observational reflection and/or definitional 
sedimentation of content, or in Patrick Jackson’s words, to an elaboration of the 
‘conduct of inquiry’. It has thereby failed, to its detriment, to reflect on and 
recognise the central importance of the deep and intricate relation between the 
content of meta-theory and the very form(s) in which it is practiced. 
Taking its cue from Kratochwil’s reflection on the deliberative nature of legal 
reasoning this article puts forward a case for a shift towards a ‘rhetoric of inquiry’ 
of meta-theory. Such an approach opens the path to conceive of meta-theory as 
an argumentative-persuasive practice whose content is deeply interwoven with 
forms of presentation on the one hand and normative commitments on the other. 
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Constructivism is one of the success stories within IR. From its early beginnings in the 1980s 
it has developed into a conceptually rich and empirically diverse set of contributions. At the 
same time, constructivism is also a telling example of the dangers and pitfalls new approaches 
in International Relations face when coming in contact with already dominant voices of the 
discipline. Admittedly, constructivism’s breadth has, to a considerable degree, developed out 
of original and innovative research agendas but at the same time it also seems clear that it 
has partly diversified as a consequence of external expectations and demands of how 
constructivism needs to ‘prove its worth’ within International Relations. Patrick Jackson1 is 
right in pointing out that the moves towards specific forms of inquiry were presented as 
initiation rituals through which constructivism needed to demonstrate its validity and 
legitimacy among already established theoretical perspectives. That such expectations in 
many ways lead to procrustean efforts at conformity and also stifle, to a certain extent, the 
scope for originality is one of the biggest problems that has befallen constructivism. 
Additionally, we have also seen quite specific forms of constructivist thought assuming 
dominant positions, leading to an association of constructivism with quite specific debates 
and problems. Here the work of Alexander Wendt2 in the early to mid 1990s and attempts to 
see constructivism as some form of ‘middle-ground’3 proved specifically influential as 
representing ‘constructivism’. Voices that raised much subtler and, for want of a better word, 
‘radical’ challenges that could not easily been assimilated into the existing conceptual and 
theoretical categorisations of the discipline received comparatively scant attention. For me 
and for the purposes of this article, third generation constructivism should mean a more 
thorough engagement with these voices. The third generation, in my view, is therefore on 
one level concerned with the neglected insights and elements of the initial founding texts and 
contributors, what could be dubbed ‘the first generation’. As indicated above, the success 
story of ‘constructivism’ in IR developed a number of hot spots around which the debates so 
far have developed; it has, however, at the same time – and as a consequence of this 
trajectory – neglected strands of thought and thematic, theoretical and conceptual impulses. 
It is this ‘ad fontes’ call that informs my view of the place and contribution within the ‘third 
generation’. Naturally, I am not arguing that this is the only way to understand third 
generation constructivism; even more importantly, though, this perspective must not be 
misunderstood as an exercise in the history of thought in IR by providing an archaeology of 
early constructivist thought. Rather, so far neglected impulses from the early contributions of 
constructivism in IR should be understood as a resource, as points of departure that respond 
and help us address the challenges we (still) face. They should be taken as a chance to provide 
new roads to theoretical and empirical innovation in an ever more complex discipline. As a 
consequence, it is not sufficient to just ‘rediscover’ earlier work but rather pick up the spirit 
and trajectory inherent in it and think through its implications and suggest further paths of 
constructivist development. 
Naturally, provided the space at our disposal here, such engagements can only provide initial 
indications of new and, hopefully, fruitful directions for constructivist scholarship. The 
particular focus I would like to sketch out in a bit more detail concerns the contribution to 
meta-theoretical scholarship ‘third generation’ constructivism could make. Constructivism 
entered an arena of thought that was dominated by approaches with very specific views on 
ontological, epistemological and methodological matters has it has already provided 
important impulses for new theoretical and conceptual directions. In many instances, 
however, it still oriented itself on the prevailing theoretical order and its demands. 
Publications that directly and fundamentally challenged this order on a grand theoretical 
scale found it difficult, despite their sophistication, to exert influence across the discipline – 
that they still managed to shape substantial parts of constructivist research attests to their 
intellectual forcefulness and erudition.  
Nevertheless, constructivist scholarship has so far struggled with developing coherent and 
consolidated positions in matters meta-theoretical. The particular perspective from which 
this struggle is approached here concerns the very nature of the practice of meta-theorising. 
It is the central argument of this piece that contributions to meta-theory in IR, be they positive 
or negative, have so far only focussed on the content of meta-theory but they have failed to 
recognise the deep and intricate relation between this content and the very form(s) in which 
it is presented. Taking this perspective, this contribution is in many ways linked to recent 
literature in International Relations that focusses on the role of ‘practice’ and the notion and 
central importance of reflexivity.4 As David McCourt5 points out in his contribution to this 
special issue, the notion of reflexivity is as much a challenge as it is an opportunity for 
constructivist scholarship. The “insufficient reflexivity towards the social construction of 
knowledge itself […] requires adding a second moment to all constructivist research, one that 
addresses the structural relationship between the object of study … and the various sites in 
which legitimate knowledge about it is produced, including, if appropriate, the academy”6. 
The object of study in question here is meta-theory itself, seemingly a rather abstract, self-
contained subject area within the academic realm. The ways in which meta-theory has been 
approached so far, however, reveals the same lack of reflexive attention that characterises 
the wider field of International Relations. As will be further elaborated below, the different 
ways in which meta-theory in IR has been addressed so far, both in terms of its locus and 
focus, suffer from a lack of reflexivity towards their very own practices. Meta-theory, as the 
object of engagement, is in each instance still caught in the logic of representation.7 Similar 
to the various political practices that have often been only looked at and represented from 
the outside, contributions to meta-theory represent its subject matter as something to be 
discussed but the very ways of representation are themselves not subjected to any further 
reflection. As a consequence, the practice of meta-theorising has so far restricted itself to 
exercises of observational reflection and/or definitional sedimentation of content, or in 
Patrick Jackson’s8 words, to an elaboration of the ‘conduct of inquiry’. In contrast, a shift 
towards a ‘rhetoric of inquiry’, as it is suggested here, opens the path to conceive of meta-
theory as an argumentative-persuasive practice whose content is deeply interwoven with 
forms of presentation on the one hand and normative commitments on the other. Centrally, 
and in line with the comments made above, such a reflexive exercise seeks to unearth a 
crucial dimension of the practice of meta-theorising that points beyond and at the same time 
illuminates and contextualises the ways in which substantive meta-theoretical content 
becomes represented. Exploring how form, content and ethics coalesce in the rhetorical 
practice of meta-theorising shines new light on the relation between theory and practice and 
invites deeper insights into the very basics and scholarly practices that constitute 
International Relations scholarship more generally.  
My particular point of departure here is a central aspect in Kratochwil’s classic ‘Rules, Norms, 
and Decisions’9 which most clearly appears in chapter 8. In this chapter, Kratochwil develops 
the connection between practical reasoning and rhetoric in relation to legal arguments. 
Taking the cue from this treatment of the central role of rhetoric in deliberative endeavours, 
the remainder of this article makes a case for conceptualising the realm and practice of meta-




THE CHALLENGE OF META-THEORY 
IR has never been afraid to raise and discuss questions of a meta-theoretical nature, be it 
either in the exchange about methodology between ‘scientific’ vs ’traditionalist’ positions in 
IR in the 1960s10, in the epistemological quarrels surrounding ‘positivism’ since the 1980s11 
or, indeed, in the emerging focus on ontology since the late 1990s.12 Yet, at the same time 
meta-theorising has also always been seen as a distracting exercise, becoming dangerously 
abstract when pursued for too long. As Chris Reus-Smit has recently pointed out, “[t]he 
argument most commonly heard today, however, is that theory’s main purpose is the 
generation of practically relevant knowledge and that metatheoretical reflections and 
debates are an unhelpful distraction.”13 
There seem to have developed three basic positions on matters meta-theoretical that 
warrant some reflection: the first equates meta-theorising with scholasticism, the second 
charges meta-theory with standing in the way of a fruitful eclecticism and the third reduces 
meta-theory to definitional discussions about ontology, epistemology and methodology. I 
argue that all three to a larger or smaller degree miss a central challenge meta-theorising 
poses for scholars of all persuasions. In particular, and contrary to the representations 
inherent in these perspectives, the specific views on what ‘meta-theory’ is and does are not 
something present or observable in an existing, external meta-theoretical realm that can 
simply be represented objectively; these views are themselves constructed out of specific 
scholarly practices that always already predispose particular views on the alleged content, 
strengths and weaknesses of ‘meta-theory’.  What is lacking in these accounts is a properly 
reflexive understanding that explicitly illuminates that meta-theorising is as much 
constructing a specific view on meta-theory as it itself is constructed out of specific scholarly 
practices that establish its particular being. One way to grasp this challenge of reflexivity and 
grapple with it is by breaking open the relation between the form and content of meta-
theorising via a rhetoric of inquiry. Before we, however, can outline what such an approach 
would entail it is necessary to briefly engage with the abovementioned three positions on 
meta-theorising in order to develop a clear sense of what this article is concerned with.  
 
The first position that sees meta-theory as scholasticism is aptly summarised in the now 
famous article by William Wallace14 following his address at BISA in 1994. While 
acknowledging a certain degree of ‘theory’ as part of academic endeavours, Wallace  criticises 
IR’s theoretical overindulgence and argues that “International Relations […] has become too 
detached from the world of practice, too fond of theory (and meta-theory) as opposed to 
empirical research, too self-indulgent, and in some cases too self-righteous.”15 The danger 
meta-theory poses to ‘proper’ IR scholarship is a retreat into abstraction, devoid of empirical 
relevance and incapable of providing insights into political processes. In such a view, IR must 
continue to engage with ‘real world problems’ and stand clear of the danger “to take refuge 
in increasing abstractions, theories and meta-theories: to move from scholarship to 
scholasticism.”16 Whereas this scaremongering about the (meta-)theoretical disease 
undermining the healthy (empirical) parts of the discipline has somewhat subsided since the 
mid 1990s, the general suspicions connected to meta-theoretical reflection are never far 
away (for a more recent instantiation see for instance Smith’ and Jones’17 position on the rise 
of Critical Terrorism Studies). 
While it is easy to agree that “we should not […] allow academics to use theoretical 
uncertainty as an excuse to abandon empirical research”18, one is left to wonder who really 
has committed this ‘crime’ of abandoning empirical research. The growing literature in post-
positivist scholarship includes a considerable amount of empirical studies – maybe not of the 
kind some critics deem ‘proper’ but that is then more a matter of form rather than theoretical 
vs empirical content. In any case, it is simply not enough to dismiss large quantities of 
scholarship as being conducted by self-righteous and self-absorbed ‘theorists’ that threaten 
to undermine the validity and legitimacy of IR research. The portent of the self-destruction of 
IR due to an improper theoretical focus in many cases seems to be based more on prejudice 
and unwillingness to engage than an actual looming decline of IR. Maintaining this intellectual 
scare-mongering seems dubious at best and dangerously myopic at worst. 
The second position of meta-theorising in IR offers a more nuanced and sophisticated 
criticism. Rather than dismissing meta-theory as self-indulgent scholasticism, it locates the 
danger in its tendency towards paradigmatism and the incommensurability of diverging 
positions. “What most consistently divides [...] schools of thought are [...] their meta-
theoretical assumptions [...]. Although such foundational assumptions typically cannot be 
subjected to empirical tests, they influence many research tasks […].”19 Worse still, these 
assumptions have often been consolidated into paradigmatic positions that “[obscure] both 
the compatibilities among different approaches, and the complex ways in which they 
interrelate.”20 Due to its ‘ideological’ character paradigmatism is deeply divisive and in many 
cases leads to encrusted and fenced off positions that cause researchers to stick to their flag 
and defend their camp against all criticisms21, thereby forfeiting opportunities to explore 
complementary elements and assumptions across their approaches.22 As a consequence, this 
group of scholars suggest to bury the deep seated ideological, paradigmatic (i.e. meta-
theoretical) cleavages and move from the antagonistic battleground of meta-theory to the 
cooperative shores of eclectic mid-level theory.23 Proponents of this line of argument such as 
David Lake24, Sil and Katzenstein25 or Barkin26 base their view on a specific reading of the 
‘great debates’ or the ‘paradigm wars’ and welcome the waning of both. Whereas this 
position presents a much more substantial criticism of meta-theory, it has its own 
shortcomings. It might very well be the case that the paradigmatism in some parts of IR has 
led to seemingly mutually exclusive and ideologically fenced of positions portrayed as 
monolithic and incompatible sets of meta-theoretical and theoretical assumptions. It 
remains, however, highly questionable if this view ever was actually representative of the 
divisions between them. The reason why eclecticism can be successful has probably less to 
do with the fact that ‘meta-theoretical’ debates are phased out, thereby opening the door to 
cross-theory endeavours. At closer inspection it rather seems that the existing theoretical 
frameworks (for example in the work of Barkin27) always already shared certain meta-
theoretical commitments and assumptions which allowed this complementary eclecticism to 
emerge. 
It seems to me that rather than growing out of an abandonment of ‘irresolvable meta-
theoretical quarrels’ eclecticism emerges out of an abandonment of a specific portrayal of a 
paradigmatically divided discipline that never was quite accurate to begin with. In other 
words, the culprit that prevented eclecticism to emerge earlier were not irresolvable ‘meta-
theoretical’ debates but a discipline that was held captive by an image that pitched 
apparently incommensurable ‘paradigms’ against each other.  In fact, to fully understand and 
capitalise on the potential of theoretical eclecticism meta-theoretical inquiry seems 
necessary. 
Finally, the third position of meta-theory in IR understands the inevitable impact of meta-
theoretical assumptions on theoretical and empirical aspects of IR scholarship. The task here 
is to clearly define and defend the substantive content of meta-theoretical concepts on the 
basis of which theoretical frameworks are developed and empirical research is carried out. 
Although the most sympathetic position, the role of meta-theorising is here understood as a 
purely definitional exercise in which the notions of ‘ontology’, ‘epistemology’ and 
‘methodology’ are settled for further use. While such a conception of the practice of meta-
theorising may seem intuitively appropriate (after all what is meta-theorising if not a 
conceptual clarification of the most basic building blocks of theoretical endeavours), one 
cannot help but be struck by the vastly diverging ways in which this task is carried out. Even 
a cursory glance across the meta-theoretical literature in current International Relations 
exemplifies that the definitional exercises rely on vastly different forms of presentation. This 
aspect of meta-theorising has so far been ignored in the sense that the form of meta-
theorising has not been connected in any meaningful or sustained manner to the content that 
is presented. It is the central concern of this contribution to argue that this is a costly 
oversight, not only because it misperceives the practice of meta-theorising due to a lack of 
reflexivity but also because it prolongs and reproduces a distorted picture of the place and 
function of meta-theory in International Relations. It is further contended that constructivism 
is very well placed to provide a much more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the 
practice of meta-theorising and its role within and impact on theoretical and empirical 
endeavours in International Relations by reflexively engaging with the very forms in which 
this practice becomes instantiated. 
 
THE PROMISES OF A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO META-THEORY  
The puzzle of why the content of meta-theory is presented in so vastly diverging ways starts 
with an observation that is hardly contentious. As we have already seen above, meta-
theoretical arguments and positions are often seen as irresolvable, mostly because they 
concern claims which escape logical proof or direct empirical validation. To use Stephen 
Toulmin’s formulation, the debates taking place at this level of scholarship are of a basically 
conceptual nature and strategic character. They are conceptual as they refer to and are 
concerned with “the skills, traditions, the activities, procedures, or instruments of Man’s [sic] 
intellectual life and imagination.”28 Czubaroff highlights the central concern of conceptual 
questions quite well:  
Unlike empirical questions which presuppose agreement about the concepts in 
terms of which they are stated and which have specific, replicable answers, and 
unlike formal questions which concern the structure and organization of an already 
accepted symbolism, conceptual questions are frames with a view toward 
constructing ‘better’ terminologies, nomenclatures, or explanations.29  
The very nature of these conceptual debates, as opposed to empirical or formal discussions, 
makes them strategic in character as what is at stake are the very basic forms of thinking and 
acting with which a subject matter should be apprehended rather than the formulation of 
theoretical approaches already relying upon the existence of such forms.  
Understanding meta-theorising as strategic, conceptual argumentation already hints 
at a crucial communicative dimension as the existing, and well known, disagreements about 
central meta-theoretical questions do not allow for a simple and purely demonstrative, 
representational approach. Communication about meta-theory, i.e. the very ways in which 
practitioners of meta-theory go about relating their claims to an audience, cannot a priory 
rely on an already existing common framework in reference to which these questions can be 
settled; there is no single agreed-upon symbolic order that could be referred to.30 Neither can 
these questions simply be settled with reference to empirical observation as “[t]he resolution 
of such disputes is complicated because an indefinite number of theoretical [better: 
conceptual] explanations are logically possible due to the underdetermination of theory by 
empirical data.”31 Rather, due to their strategic nature, the practice of meta-theorising 
requires deliberative reflection about basic conceptual frameworks on the basis of which 
theoretical refinement can emerge. Mere definitional, assertive statements cannot settle the 
debates, arguments and discussions which ensue in response to meta-theoretical concerns, 
and which always entail the possibility of fundamentally divergent answers. Doing so would 
place an undue burden on language in securing apodictic meta-theoretical positions.  
The understanding of meta-theory as a basically strategic and conceptual enterprise 
in pursuit of a symbolic order introduces a strong sense of contingency as the claims 
connected to the substantiation of answers to meta-theoretical questions exceed the 
possibility of cognitive proof or logical necessity. Contingency, however, tasks the scholar who 
answers these questions not just with providing substantive content but also (and probably 
more importantly) to argumentatively provide reasons for why this content should be 
accepted as valid and appropriate. In other words meta-theorising as a scholarly practice is 
intrinsically deliberative and not just demonstrative in its argumentative practice. The 
linguistic excess in which a defence of the relevance and appropriateness of the conceptual 
content is given forms a trans-substantive framework without which a meta-theoretical 
position would not be tenable. This deliberative structure of meta-theorising highlights the 
importance of reflexively engaging not only with what is said but also how it is said and by 
whom.  
This challenge of reflexivity is also the reason why it is not enough to rest here and 
link directly to existing themes within constructivist scholarship that highlight the central role 
of language in the emergence of meanings. Doing so would mean simply turning to the ways 
in which different meanings of core meta-theoretical terms are constructed and reproduced. 
However, looking at how language is used in meta-theory and how competing meanings of 
core terms evolve does not get us very far in terms of understanding the practice of meta-
theorising in relation to the intersection of its content (what is said) and form (how it is said). 
Tracing the evolution of meanings and the linguistic processes behind it would still very much 
be a representational exercise concerned with the substantive delineation of central 
elements (even if their understanding of language would appreciate the contingency of 
meanings). Admittedly, it would raise valid questions about the often assumed neutrality and 
universality of core terms but in terms of overcoming the representational bias in critically 
investigating the modes of argumentation and deliberation, focusing on the emergence of 
meaning in linguistic use alone would fall short of the necessary depth and nuance.  
 Instead, it would be central to assume a perspective that takes the deliberative 
elements in the practice of meta-theorising not only serious but also addresses it as a central 
feature of discourse. In order to do so, the approach needed should open avenues to explore 
and unveil the intricate relationship between what is said (content) and how it is said (form). 
In other words, if we want to gain a fuller picture of what constitutes the practice and process 
of meta-theorising in IR we need to understand first of all how persuasion is achieved (or at 
least what argumentative strategies are chosen to achieve it) given the contentious and 
contingent nature of its substantive concerns. The art of persuasion through deliberation 
points us clearly in the direction of one of the most long-standing but also very contentious 
practices in Western thought, a practice that, as I have mentioned above, also featured in 
seminal, early contributions to constructivist scholarship – the art of rhetoric.32 Despite all the 
meta-theoretical work in IR, however, there is so far no sustained attempt to think through 
or even acknowledge the consequences that arise out of the central insight that the practice 
of meta-theorising is fundamentally rhetorical.  
 
 
THE RHETORIC OF INQUIRY – THE FORM, CONTENT AND ETHICS OF META-THEORISING 
Invoking the notion of rhetoric as the art of persuasion in relation to meta-theory in 
International Relations is bound to elicit a variety of reactions – positive and negative. On the 
one hand, linking rhetoric as the art of persuasion to the political realm broadly conceived 
hardly sparks any controversial reactions.33 
Yet, although the role of rhetoric in public affairs, the realm in which it has been placed since 
its inception in ancient Greece, is widely acknowledged, its invocation also always carries 
some clearly negative undertones.34 Especially “[w]hen ‘rhetoric’ is used in reference to 
scientists, textbook writers, reporters, and the like, it is frequently a term of derision, a way 
of suggesting that they have violated principles held high in their professions.”35 Introducing 
the art of persuasion into the realms of academic and scientific discourse often invokes 
suspicion. “Indeed, more often than not these days the term is associated with speech 
oriented primarily towards deception, superficiality or manipulation. ‘Rhetoric’ is routinely 
contrasted with speech that adheres to ‘reality’ or with the ‘truth’ that can be found ‘behind’ 
words, the truth of the real ‘interests’ or intentions that are deliberately obscured by 
language.”36  
 
However, communication and its linguistic practices, among them the art of argument and 
persuasion, provide a central element in any analysis of conceptual debates. Understanding 
concepts and the symbolic orders in which they emerge, develop and are substantiated as 
historically contingent artefacts means a shift in  
attention away from the abstract and allegedly universal standards of Reason and 
toward the ‘warrants’ and ‘backings’ of particular reasonings. [This] means stressing 
the importance of the audience in humanistic and scientific speech: the warrants and 
backings must be shared with the audience if an argument is to have power. And it 
entails focusing on the figurative and even the mythic parts of inquiry.37  
Such a perspective recognises the “pluralism in which methods of inquiry and argument are 
adapted to the particular subject under investigation.”38 Acknowledging the specificity of 
symbolic orders and their concomitant conceptual content – temporally, spatially and in 
relation to a specific subject matter – allows the creation of “languages for talking about what 
we have in common and for understanding why we do not – and cannot – have everything in 
common. Rhetoric of inquiry is a way of conversing about intellectual conversation – and 
improving its quality.”39 If the development of concepts remains a social activity the 
substance of which is temporally, spatially and substantively contingent, the manners in 
which concepts gain acceptance and ‘power’ in scientific and intellectual discourse cannot be 
reduced to their substantive claims justified with reference to either logic or cognition. 
Rather, there is always a need to provide supporting arguments as to why these substantive 
claims, these conceptualisations and not others should be accepted. As a consequence 
“[r]hetoric of inquiry is needed precisely because facts themselves are mute. Whatever the 
fact, we do the speaking – whether through them or for them.”40 Speaking through or for 
facts that are never sufficient to carry the weight of conceptual claims by themselves, 
however, is a not a descriptive, assertive practice but rather aims at convincing an audience 
through argumentation.  
Against the persisting scare-mongering that the acceptance of rhetorical practice within 
academic discourse will dispense with truth and knowledge founded on rational principles of 
method, it is necessary to realise that “the underside of this claim is that the truth has been 
transmitted in ways that are themselves evidently rhetorical.”41 The contingent nature of the 
substantive claims that form the content of prevalent conceptual frameworks makes 
argumentation and persuasion necessary and links conceptual and abstract thought to 
rhetorical practice. More importantly, though, this intersection between what conceptual 
substance is presented and how it is presented denies any possibility to separate the linguistic 
practice in which content is given from the substantive claims advanced in the process of 
argumentation.  Rather, in each instance there is the necessity for the orator “to combine […] 
knowledge with a command of language, and […] to adapt both language and content in the 
specific act of making a persuasive message. Hence this task involve[s] an obvious and 
practical union of form and content.”42 This practical union must not be understood simply in 
terms of the interconnectivity between ‘form’ and ‘content’ but actually suggests a proper 
cross-contamination so that we need to speak, in an analytically correct manner, of the form 
of the content and the content of the form. Heuristically, we can separate these two 
elements; practically, however, they are not separable in a sustainable, non-reductionist 
fashion.  We reach here the core elements within a rhetorical approach to concept formation 
and dissemination in IR meta-theory. 
In light of this, the current instantiations of meta-theory in IR cannot simply be reduced to 
the delineation of substantive content but in this very development require and rely on 
argumentative structures aimed at persuading relevant audiences of the validity of their 
claims. As a result, we cannot be content in our quest for a deeper and more nuanced 
understanding of meta-theory and meta-theorising by reducing its practice to purely 
definitional exercises that establish content while remaining unreflective of the central 
importance of the argumentative forms that sustains it. Rather, we need to grasp and uncover 
the rhetorical elements that are used if we want to achieve a comprehensive understanding 
of the practice of meta-theorising in both its form and content. Our attention then widens 
from the question of how we conduct inquiry in IR in terms of substance to include a 
deliberation of the rhetoric that sustains such conduct – in other words we shift from a sole 
focus on the conduct of inquiry to the broader focus on the rhetoric of inquiry that combines 
form and content. Such a shift “reflects a renewed concern for the quality of speaking and 
writing in scholarship. It emphasizes the interaction of style and substance. […] [R]hetoric of 
inquiry shows what we are really doing and how to criticise it. […] Rhetoric of inquiry explores 
how reason is rhetorical.”43 
Importantly, the ways in which persuasion is sought cannot be reduced to a universal 
description of rhetoric; rather a rhetoric of inquiry must engage with the specific subject 
matter at hand – the content is as much part of the form as the form becomes part of the 
content. “[…] [P]ersuasion about theoretical issues becomes a kind of activity in its own right. 
The conditions for effecting persuasion […] are typically different, and thus they generate 
specifically different models of rhetorical practice.”44 Inquiring successfully into the interplay 
of form and content therefore “[…] requires the generation of a model that encompasses the 




Excluding meta-theorising from the realm of IR does not ‘solve the problem’ of its 
undecidable, perennial questions steeped in ‘ideology’ and ‘mere opinion’; nor does it purify 
scholarship by purging ‘philosophical’ and ‘ideological’ (read contingent and irresolvable) 
debates from IR proper. In fact, it merely achieves a cover up of the inevitable, underlying 
deliberative practices that inform the development of concepts and theories in IR. Even the 
seemingly ‘rational’ position of sedimenting yet again the belief in the possibility to develop 
a purely demonstrative basis for research resting upon agreed upon fundamental principles 
is hard to maintain upon closer inspection. Given the underlying deliberative and rhetorical 
dimension in conceptual discourse, re-engaging with contemporary contributions to meta-
theory in IR from a rhetorical perspective illuminates the fusion of form and content in all 
instances of conceptual deliberation. As such it promises a more nuanced, comprehensive 
and reflective understanding of what constitutes meta-theorising in International Relations 
in its various manifestations.  
Although such an endeavour may seem far removed from the urgencies of crises in the 
political realm, reflexivity towards our most basic assumptions will show that spaces for 
human action are disclosed and concealed in relation to them.  Responding to the wide array 
of political challenges at the beginning of the 21st century and taking the consequences of 
human action seriously does not only call for political and social action. It also demands an 
explicit and critical engagement with the assumptions we bring to the processes of decision-
making that in turn inform the choices we make in response to these challenges. As such, 
meta-theory as the most fundamental level of reflection must assume an important role in 
assessing and formulating the conditions according to which understanding is achieved and 
action becomes legitimised. We need to understand what it means to meta-theorise (form), 
what exactly the conceptualisations of core elements entail (content) and what consequences 
these two dimensions have for the evaluation of meta-theory both in assessing the relations 
between competing meta-theoretical systems and the consequences for informing the 
theoretical and empirical dimensions of the study of world politics (ethics). Ignoring the 
complexity of meta-theorising and assuming its supposed clarity and mono-dimensional 
purpose bears risks much beyond meta-theory itself. Reducing meta-theory to a mostly 
definitional exercise or, even worse, ignoring it altogether opens the door to exclusivist 
practices and ontological and epistemological blind spots with possibly dire consequences. 
After all, a tyranny of the word all too easily can become a tyranny of the deed.  
Third generation constructivism has an opportunity here to connect to its forebears and carry 
on their substantive insights into forms of reflection and intellectual openness that will serve 
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